Security & Trust
Last updated: 10 November 2026
Closeout holds unremediated findings for your clients and replays proof requests against their systems. A breach would hand an attacker a map of open holes, so the platform is designed on the assumption that it will be attacked. This page describes how it works today, including what isn't done yet. Every statement here comes from the code and configuration that run the service.
- Hosted on one server at Hostinger, in the United Kingdom.
- HTTPS everywhere, with HSTS.
- Proof requests, report PDFs, 2FA secrets and tracker credentials encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
- Tenant isolation enforced by PostgreSQL Row-Level Security.
- Two-factor authentication (TOTP) is mandatory for firm staff.
- Retests only reach client-acknowledged hosts, inside the testing window, at 1 request/second per host.
- Append-only audit log of sign-ins, scope approvals, retests and report downloads.
- No SOC 2, no ISO 27001, Audited by a professional pentester.
1. Who's behind Closeout
Closeout is created, built and run by Joel Morillas Pagan, who writes the code and operates the infrastructure described on this page.
The legal operator of the service, and the party to the Terms and the Data Processing Agreement, is Elena Pagan Miravalls, Avinguda del Tancat de la Plana, 71, 43700 El Vendrell (Tarragona), España (see Contact).
2. Infrastructure and data location
- Provider and location: a single virtual server at Hostinger International Ltd., in the United Kingdom. It runs the web app, the API, the retest worker, the mailer, PostgreSQL 16 and Redis 7, each in its own Docker container.
- Exposure: only the reverse proxy (Caddy) accepts connections from the internet, on ports 80 and 443; the firewall denies everything else except SSH, which accepts keys only. The web app and the API listen on 127.0.0.1. PostgreSQL and Redis sit on internal Docker networks with no internet access.
- Containers: the application containers run as a non-root user, with a read-only filesystem, every Linux capability dropped and
no-new-privileges. The operating system installs security updates automatically. - Report PDFs are stored as encrypted files on the same server's disk, not with a third-party storage provider.
- Redis holds only job queues and rate-limit counters, password-protected and with persistence turned off.
- One region, one server: there is no multi-region failover. If that server goes down, Closeout is down until it is restored from backup (see Retention).
3. Encryption
In transit. The site and the API are served only over HTTPS (Let's Encrypt certificates), with Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains. Email to our sending provider requires TLS. A retest uses the scheme of the finding's own URL: a finding on an http:// endpoint is replayed over plain HTTP, because that is what is being tested.
At rest, in the application. AES-256-GCM, with one data key per engagement, itself wrapped by a master key. Each ciphertext is bound to its record (authenticated data), so it can't be moved to another finding or report. Encrypted this way:
- Proof requests: the headers and bodies that may carry your client's session tokens. Decrypted only inside the retest worker, at the moment of the request; the API returns header names only.
- Report PDFs, in 1 MiB chunks bound to the report and to their position, so a file can't be swapped, reordered or truncated without the download failing.
- Two-factor (TOTP) secrets and issue-tracker credentials.
Hashed, never stored: passwords (scrypt), session tokens and API tokens (SHA-256).
Not encrypted at application level: finding titles, descriptions, severities and remediation notes, retest evidence (status, headers and a 4 KB body excerpt, with secrets redacted) and account data. They are protected by access control, not by encryption. Backups are encrypted (see Retention).
Not done yet: the master key lives in the environment of the API and worker processes, not in a KMS or HSM; moving it to a KMS is on our roadmap. The server's disk is not encrypted at the operating-system level, and we haven't confirmed whether Hostinger encrypts its storage underneath, so we make no claim that it does.
4. Isolation and access control
- Tenant isolation in the database. Every tenant table has PostgreSQL Row-Level Security. The role the API uses only sees rows of the firm set for the current transaction; with no firm set it sees nothing, so a missing filter returns no rows instead of another firm's.
- Least-privilege database roles. Sign-in and the retest worker use separate roles with column-level grants: the worker can't read users or sessions, nor edit finding content or the audit log. The superuser is used only for migrations.
- Separated processes. The retest worker is on its own network and can't reach the API. The mailer has no database access and no encryption key.
- Roles. Owner, tester and client. Client users see only the engagements they were invited to. Only owners manage the team, billing, integrations and the retest kill switch, and only they can read the audit log.
- Firm staff sign in with a password and a mandatory TOTP code (replay-protected, with single-use recovery codes). Sign-in is rate-limited per IP, and an account is locked for 15 minutes after repeated failures.
- Client users sign in with single-use email links; the token travels in the URL fragment, so it never reaches server logs. Their sessions last 24 hours. They don't have two-factor authentication.
- Sessions are random 256-bit tokens in an
__Host-, Secure, httpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie. Staff sessions end after 12 hours idle or 7 days. Users can list and revoke their sessions, changing the password revokes the others, and deactivating a user ends theirs immediately. - Browser: every state-changing request must come from our own origin, and a per-request nonce Content-Security-Policy blocks injected scripts and framing.
- API tokens (Agency plan) are created by an owner with 2FA, shown once, stored hashed, expire, act with tester rights only and can't touch account, team, billing or token endpoints.
Not available yet: SSO/SAML, passkeys (WebAuthn) and a breached-password check (only a local list of common passwords is blocked).
5. Retest safety
Responsibility. Closeout doesn't decide what may be tested. The firm enters the host list and testing window when it creates the engagement, and the client must acknowledge that scope in the portal before any retest can run. The acknowledgement is recorded in the audit log with who, when, from which IP and which hosts, and the scope can't be edited afterwards. Getting authorization to test those systems is the firm's and its client's responsibility (see the Terms); Closeout enforces the scope they agreed on.
Before every request, the worker checks:
- The URL is http(s) and carries no credentials.
- The client has acknowledged the scope, and the current time is inside the testing window.
- The host is in the acknowledged list (
*.example.comcovers subdomains, not the apex). - The firm hasn't paused retests and its subscription is active. Both are checked again when the job runs, not only when it is queued.
DNS rebinding. The host is resolved once, every address is validated, and the connection is pinned to those addresses, so an answer that changes between the check and the connection can't redirect the request. Private, loopback, link-local (including the 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata address), multicast and other non-public ranges are refused. The service refuses to start in production if private targets are allowed.
Limits. One request per retest. Redirects are never followed. The response body is capped at 512 KB, with a 5 s connection and a 10 s response timeout. At most 1 request per second per target host, across all workers. Monthly retest quota per plan: Solo 100 · Firm 1,000 · Agency 5,000.
Kill switch. A firm owner can pause every retest of the firm at once; queued retests are stopped too, and the change is audited.
Verdicts. 401, 403, 407, 408, 429 and 5xx responses are inconclusive, never "fixed". Closeout never closes a finding on its own: a person reviews the evidence and confirms.
Not done yet: these checks are enforced in the application. A second wall at the network layer (a firewall denying the worker any private range) is on our roadmap.
6. Retest source IPs
Retests leave from the public IP address of the server. Ask your client to allowlist it in their WAF or rate limiter; otherwise a block from the WAF can hide the real result of a retest. Retests leave over IPv4 only, so a target reachable only over IPv6 can't be retested.
187.77.100.232
7. Audit trail
The audit log is append-only for the application: its database roles can add entries and read them, never change or delete them. Recorded actions include:
- Sign-ins and failed sign-ins, sign-in links, 2FA enrollment, password changes and new recovery codes.
- Team invitations, joins and deactivations; client invitations; acceptance of the Terms.
- Engagements, findings and imports created or changed; scope acknowledgements (with IP and hosts).
- Every retest requested and its outcome: verdict, reason and the IP address the target resolved to.
- Report uploads and deletions; API and Burp token creation and revocation; integrations connected or disconnected; billing changes; kill-switch changes.
Each client and staff download of a report is recorded separately, with user, role, IP and time. Firm owners see the latest entries in their settings.
Retention: for as long as the firm's account exists; it is deleted with the account. Not done yet: logs aren't copied to a separate write-once store.
8. Retention and deletion
- While the account exists its data is kept. If the subscription ends, the firm becomes read-only: data, the client portal and attestations stay readable, and retests stop.
- Deletion today is manual. There is no self-service delete or export button yet. Write to privacy@getcloseout.tech: we export the data if you want it and then delete the firm, which removes its users, engagements, findings, proof requests, retests, reports and audit log. Report files are removed from disk within hours. Our Privacy Policy commits to deleting within 30 days of the account ending.
- Reports: a version that hasn't been downloaded by the client can be deleted by the firm. A delivered version can't, because it is the proof of delivery the attestation cites.
- Backups: a nightly database dump, encrypted with a public key whose private half isn't on the server, so the server can write backups but not read them. Report files are copied already encrypted. Copies are kept 14 days on the server and pulled off it every week to equipment we control in the EU, where they are kept 120 days. Deleted data disappears from every backup within 120 days. There is no point-in-time recovery: a restore from the server's own copies loses up to a day, and if the server itself were lost, up to a week.
9. Sub-processors
| Provider | Purpose | Location |
|---|---|---|
| Hostinger International Ltd. | Server: hosting, database, report files, backups | Servers in the United Kingdom (company in Cyprus) |
| Resend, Inc. | Sending service emails | United States |
| ImprovMX Incorporated | Forwarding of mail sent to our @getcloseout.tech addresses (support, security, privacy) | United States (company); incoming mail is processed in France |
| Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited (Microsoft 365) | The inbox where that mail is received and answered | Ireland (company) |
| GoDaddy Europe Limited | Reseller of that Microsoft 365 inbox, and the party to its contract | United Kingdom |
| Stripe Payments Europe, Ltd. | Payments (Stripe Checkout and billing portal); independent controller for card data, which never reaches our servers | Ireland |
Service emails carry finding references and links, never titles, hosts or evidence, so the email provider doesn't see vulnerability details. The site loads no analytics, advertising or third-party scripts and uses no CDN. Issue trackers you connect (GitHub, Jira, Linear) are your choice, not our sub-processors.
10. GDPR and DPA
For the data you put into Closeout about your engagements, you are the controller and we are the processor. Our Data Processing Agreement (GDPR Article 28) is part of the Terms and applies without a signature; write to privacy@getcloseout.tech for a signed copy. It commits us to notifying you of a personal data breach within 48 hours of becoming aware of it. The United Kingdom has an EU adequacy decision. How we handle the personal data of our own users is in the Privacy Policy.
11. Compliance status
Closeout has no SOC 2 report and no ISO 27001 certification, and has not yet had a third-party penetration test. Commissioning an independent test is on our roadmap. If your client's procurement needs a security questionnaire answered, write to us and we'll answer it with the same honesty as this page.
What we do have: every change runs through CI with type checking, unit tests (scope, SSRF, crypto, importers), an end-to-end test of the remediation loop (including MFA, tenant isolation and CSRF), dependency auditing, secret scanning of the full history (gitleaks), static analysis (Semgrep) and container and configuration scanning (Trivy). Dependencies are updated through Dependabot, and base images and CI actions are pinned by digest.
12. Responsible disclosure
If you find a vulnerability in Closeout, email security@getcloseout.tech with the steps to reproduce it. We acknowledge reports within 2 business days and aim to fix critical issues within 7 days.
We won't pursue legal action over good-faith research within this policy:
- Don't access other firms' data beyond what you need to demonstrate the issue, and don't keep it.
- Don't use Closeout's retests against hosts you aren't authorized to test.
- Don't degrade the service for others (no denial of service, no spam).
- Give us a reasonable time to fix the issue before disclosing it.
Our machine-readable contact is at /.well-known/security.txt. This is a vulnerability disclosure policy, not a paid bug bounty.
13. Security contact
- Security issues: security@getcloseout.tech
- Data protection and DPA: privacy@getcloseout.tech
- Everything else: support@getcloseout.tech